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Abstract—Clustering and analyzing on collected data can
improve user experiences and quality of services in big data,
IoT applications. However, directly releasing original data brings
potential privacy concerns, which raises challenges and opportu-
nities for privacy-preserving clustering. In this paper, we study
the problem of non-interactive clustering in distributed setting
under the framework of local differential privacy. We first
extend the Bit Vector, a novel anonymization mechanism to
be functionality-capable and privacy-preserving. Based on the
modified encoding mechanism, we propose kCluster algorithm
that can be used for clustering in the anonymized space. We show
the modified encoding mechanism can be easily implemented in
existing clustering algorithms that only rely on distance informa-
tion, such as DBSCAN. Theoretical analysis and experimental
results validate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Local Differential Privacy, Bit Vector, Dis-
tributed clustering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clustering is one of the most frequently-used methods in
data-driven applications such as data mining, machine learning,
computer vision, pattern recognition, recommender system
and so on [1], [2]. Datasets could be divided into several
classes by different clustering algorithms such as DBSCAN
and k-means. Instances in the same classes have potential
similarities, which are useful in data analysis. Taking user type
analytics in electronic commerce applications as an example,
clustering analysis on existing users with their characteristics
and behaviors can be used in classifying new users to provide
better shopping services.
With a variety of data being collected and analyzed, the
underlying privacy leakage of clustering must be stressed.
However, most current clustering approaches are not privacy-
preserving when designed. As show in [3], [4], knowing the
cluster results, one’s precise position might be revealed in
trajectory clustering with k-means clustering algorithm. Under
such circumstances, how to control individual’s privacy loss
has became a substantial problem in big data analysis.
Without loss of generality, the private data clustering can
be classified into two approaches, the interactive and the non-
interactive approaches. The interactive modes often follow
these rules: a query function with its sensitivity is analyzed
first, then noises are added to answers to these queries. In
non-interactive settings, a synopsis of the input dataset are
generalized and released for data analytics. To the best of our
knowledge, most work focus on clustering in the interactive
mode. [5] studies the trade-off between interactive vs. non-
interactive approaches and proposes a clustering approach that
combines both interactive and non-interactive. As far as we
know, few work has been done for non-interactive clustering
with local differential privacy.
In the background of big data environment, data required in
professional fields are usually dispersed in various data sources.
Meanwhile, data are usually sparse, noisy and incomplete when
collected [6]. The performance of clustering on sparse and
incomplete individual dataset will dramatically decline in those
situations. Gathering distributed data can improve clustering
performance, for example, by crowdsourcing [7]. With IoT and
cloud platform, data can be easily aggregated. However, col-
lecting and analyzing data that supports complicated analyzing
functions are hard to deploy. There are two main challenges:
A) How to control the underlying privacy leakage by
data releasing. Privacy is an important issue in data sharing,
especially when those data are personal-related. Differential
privacy is a strong privacy standard for privacy protection,
and has significance in data releasing. For example, [8] uses
taxonomy tree to publish data for vertically partitioned data
among two parties and shows that the integrated data preserves
utilities in classification tasks. However, applying differential
privacy with exponential mechanism in choosing attribute does
not anonymize source data, thus, data stays generalized which
potentially leads to privacy leakage. To overcome this, we
apply anonymization mechanism and then use local differential
privacy.
B) How to cluster on the anonymized dataset in dis-
tributed setting. Currently, many methods have been proposed
for privacy preserving clustering in the interactive mode [9].
These methods fail when it comes to the non interactive appli-
cation areas. From the other perspective, many anonymization
algorithms have been proposed. Currently, these mechanisms
only allow statistical analysis such as mean and frequency
estimation, thus can not be used for complicated analyzing.
Retrieving necessary information in the anonymous space is
needed.
With these two considerations, a privacy-preserving encoding
mechanism that supports clustering in the anonymous space is
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Fig. 1. Framework of privacy-preserving clustering in distributed environments.
in demand. In this paper, we first use an encoding mechanism
that embeds source data into anonymous Hamming space to
eliminate semantic information. Then we add noise to provide
indistinguishabilities based on local differential privacy. The
anonymized data can then be released and consolidated. What’s
more, we show that the released dataset from multiple sources
can be consolidated for clustering with the distance information
retrieved from anonymous space. In general, the collecting and
analyzing process is shown in Figure 1. There are three main
steps:
In the age of big data, personal-related data from user’s
side is routinely collected an which stands out the differential
privacy [10], [11].
Firstly, all data custodians need to agree on the configurations
parameters. In encoding, each data custodian embeds their data
into anonymized space locally with compromised parameters.
Then data are centralized to a data aggregator. At last, the
anonymized data is analyzed, which contains distance matrix
achieving and clustering. The encoding step should be privacy-
preserving. Thus the privacy leakage is controlled during the
whole process. For clustering utilities, distance information
should be preserved in the anonymized space.
We use the Bit Vector (BV) as basic encoding mechanism
because of its distance aware property. However the localization
of BV limits the clustering utilities and privacy-guarantee level.
We solve this problem with a modification of BV mechanism.
Then a clustering algorithm with only distance information is
proposed. The contributions can be summarized as follows:
leftmargin=*
• We enroll the capabilities of Bit Vector mechanism by dis-
covering distance consistence property in the anonymized
space to make it suitable for whole range distance
estimation.
• We expand the BV mechanism to be (, δ)- locally differ-
entially private, which provides strict privacy guarantees
for data sharing and analyzing.
• We show that the refined mechanism can be used for both
horizontally and vertically partitioned data. Typically, for
vertically partitioned data, we design the decomposition
method that has lower estimation error.
• We show that the refined encoding mechanism can be
used for clustering and can be easily used with existing
methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
related work and some preliminaries are presented. Then
in Section III, we propose a distance consistence algorithm
for whole range distance estimation and extend the BV
mechanism to be (, δ)-differentially private. Based on the
differentially private encoding mechanism, clustering algorithm
on anonymous data are delineated in Section IV. We analysis
experimental results in Section V. At last, in Section VII,
we conclude this paper and discuss future work. Besides, the
privacy analysis and limitations is presented in the Appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly introduce the distance-aware
encoding mechanism and the notion of differential privacy.
A. Distance-aware Encoding Mechanism
The distance-aware encoding schemes try to embed source
data into another space that preserves initial distance. For
example, the bloom filters, together with N-grams are frequently
used for string encoding as a solution in record linkage. The
Euclidean distance is also used in a variety of application areas.
Recently, some encoding mechanisms have been proposed for
numerical values embedding [12], [13]. Here, we introduce the
notion of Bit Vector mechanism.
The BV (Bit Vector) mechanism is first proposed for privacy-
preserving record linkage [13], [14]. Given random variables
r = {r1, r2, ..., rs}, interval parameter t and the length of data
range µ = |[L,U ]|, the encoding process can be presented by
such a series of hash functions:
hri(x) =
{
1, x ∈ [ri − t, ri + t]
0, otherwise (1)
With the BV encoding mechanism, the expected number w
of the set components which are set in each bit vector can
be given by E[w] = s · 2t/µ. As each scalar data shares the
same expected w, BV mechanism provides indistinguishability,
which can be used for privacy-preserving encoding. Also, it has
been shown that the BV mechanism can preserve Euclidean
distance in hamming space. Thus, it can be used for distance
estimation in the anonymized space, for values with dE ≤ 2t,
the Euclidean distance can be estimated by Hamming distance
in the anonymized space: dE = µ · dH/(2s). Based on these
property, BV is used for privacy-preserving record linkage
(PPRL).
B. Local Differential Privacy
The concept of differential privacy is proposed by DWork
in the context of statistical disclosure control [15]. Recent
researches have validated that mechanisms with differential
privacy output accurate statistical information about the whole
data while providing high privacy-preserving levels for single
data in datasets. Based on differential privacy, the notion of
LDP (Local Differential Privacy) is also proposed to protect
local privacy context from data analysis [16], [17], [18], [19].
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Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy). A randomized
algorithm M with domain N|X | is (, δ)-LDP if for all
S ⊆ RangeM and for all x, y in domain:
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(y) ∈ S] + δ (2)
Literately, RAPPOR [20] was proposed for studying client
data under the framework of differential privacy. In one-time
RAPPOR, a value v is first hashed into a bloom filter B
with length k by a series of hash functions. Then permanent
randomized response is added to B to get B
′
before reported.
However, the one-time RAPPOR mechanism can not be
used for distance-aware encoding as the bloom filter is not
distance-aware. To facilitate this, we use the BV mechanism as
mentioned. Instead of using permanent randomized response,
the 1Bit mechanism [21] is used to embed a numerical value.
For data from 0 to m, a numerical value is encoded to 1 with
probability 1e+1 +
x
m · e
−1
e+1 .
The 1Bit and RAPPOR mechanisms have made great
progress in some statistical areas such as mean estimation [22]
and frequency estimation [23]. Intuitively, we want to achieve
LDP in the BV mechanism to provide a privacy-preserving
distance-aware encoding mechanism.
C. Distributed clustering
In the distributed environment, each data owner performs
generalized a noised version of his dataset and sends the
perturbated datasets to aggregator for clustering (non-interactive
mode). To provide privacy guarantee, obfuscation mechanisms
such as perturbation and dimensionality-reduction methods are
used for data anonymization. The additive data perturbation
(ADP [24]) and the random subspace projection (RSP [25])
are two of the most common approaches to transfer original
data to the anonymized space in the literature.
1) ADP (Additive Data Perturbation): Each party general-
izes a noisy database by adding independent and identically
distributed Gaussian noises to records. each entry p ∈ Di is
replaced by p
′
= p + noise (noise ∼ N(0, σ)). Usually, the
noise levels represent the privacy-preserving level.
2) RSP (Random Subspace Projection): In the random
subspace projection setting, the privacy of the source data
is guaranteed as the projecting process is non-invertible. A
d-dimensional data can be projected to a q-dimensional vector
with a d × q random Gaussian matrix R by mechanism
p
′
= 1√qσpR. It has been shown that the RSP can preserve the
Euclidean distance.
The ADP and RSP based mechanism can be used for non
interactive clustering. However, both of them lack a strict
privacy-preserving guarantee of these methods. To achieve this,
we use differential privacy in the anonymized output of Bit
Vector mechanism.
D. Notations
Our paper focuses on non-interactive clustering using local
differential privacy. Before we formulate the privacy-preserving
clustering process across multiple data sources, notations used
in this paper are defined in Table I. For convenience, it is
assumed that data in each dimension is in Euclidean space.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS IN OUR PAPER
Notations Explanations
X Universe
D = {p1, ..., pn} Dataset
[L,U ] Data range
t BV parameters
M(·) Encoding mechanism
Ci(i ∈ 1, 2, ..., k) Clusters
dE(x, y) Euclidean Distance
dH(x, y) Hamming Distance
dˆE(x, y), dˆH(x, y) Estimated distance
, δ Privacy parameters
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Fig. 2. The drawback of BV mechanism. In the left example, data ranges in
[0, 10] and t = 1.2. In the right example, data ranges in [0, 100] and 2t = 30.
III. EXPANDING UTILITIES AND PRIVACY GUARANTEES OF
BV
The BV mechanism has been shown capable for privacy
preserving record linkage due to its distance-aware property.
However, we found that this mechanism has some limitations
when this mechanism is used in real life applications from the
aspect of privacy protection and usabilities (Figure 2).
Firstly, the BV mechanism guarantees privacy from the
perspective that the number of set components in different
bit vectors stays the same statistically whatever the value is.
Under such fact, an adversary can not retrieve the original data
from received bit vectors without knowing random variables.
However, our simulations show that values around L or U do
not follow this rule. More seriously, the experiments show that
the BV mechanism can only preserve distance in 2t. When
used in record linkage scenario, this property does not hurt
much. however, when in clustering, this drawback would cause
errors.
We fix the first problem by by extending U to U+t and L to
L− t, then modify µ from µ = U−L to µ = U−L+2t. This
improvement is easy to be implemented in the BV mechanism
and is included in this paper. For the limitations of usabilities,
we propose a distance consistence algorithm for whole range
distance estimation. To achieve rigorous privacy guarantee, we
then introduce the differentially private bit vector mechanism
and then analyze the decoding performance theoretically.
A. Whole range distance estimation
We first show that even though the BV mechanism can only
preserve Euclidean within a small range (2t at most), we can
still estimate distance over 2t.
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0 1.015 1.975 2.51 2.585 2.585
1.015 0 0.96 2.025 2.64 2.64
1.975 0.96 0 1.065 2.07 2.62
2.51 2.025 1.065 0 1.005 2.035
2.585 2.64 2.07 1.005 0 1.03
2.585 2.64 2.62 2.035 1.03 0
𝑥ଵ = 4 𝑥ଶ = 5 𝑥ଷ = 6 𝑥ସ = 7 𝑥ହ = 8 𝑥଺ = 9𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑦଺ = 9
𝑦ହ = 8
𝑦ସ = 7
𝑦ଷ = 6
𝑦ଶ = 5
𝑦ଵ = 4
Fig. 3. An example of wrong distance estimation. 1000 hash functions are
used and the range of data is [0, 20].
In Figure 3, we show that when the true Euclidean distance
exceeds 2t, the estimation goes wrong. In this example, we
set the interval parameter t = 1.2 and the length of bit vector
s = 1000 with data range in [L,U ] = [0, 20]. For example, the
distance between y2 = 5 and x6 = 9 should be around 4, not
2.16.
To solve this problem, we first define local view, global
view and unreachable distance. Then we find that the distance
is consistent even in the anonymized space.
Definition 2. For data x and y, we say that (x, y) are in
local view iff dE(x, y) ≤ 2t, and (x, y) are in global view iff
dE > 2t and there are limited values v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vk, such
that:
dE(x, y) = dE(x, v1) +
k−1∑
i=1
dE(vi, vi+1) + dE(vk, y) (3)
Otherwise, we say that x and y are unreachable.
Theorem 1 (Distance consistence). For numerical values x ≤
y ≤ z with both of them in local view, we have:
dˆE(x, z) = dˆE(x, y) + dˆE(y, z) (4)
Proof. Let τ = dˆE(x, y) + dˆE(y, z) − dˆE(x, z), thus, τ =
u
2s [dH(x, y) + dH(y, z) − dH(x, z)]. For short, we use ι
representing the bit is 0 or 1. As an example, when ι = 0,
the triple [ι, ι, ι] equals [0, 0, 1] and the estimated Euclidean
distance is in consistence. All the situation can be summarized
in the following table:
TABLE II
SITUATIONS OF BIT VALUE IN BIT VECTORS
bv(x) bv(y) bv(z) 2sτ/u consistence
ι ι ι 0 true
ι ι ι 0 true
ι ι ι 2 false(*)
ι ι ι 0 true
With situations in Table II (*), we can find that only when
the correspond bits in bit vector of [x, y, z] equal to [0, 1, 0]
or [1, 0, 1], the consistence fails. We will show that this is
impossible. We first analyze the case of [x, y, z] = [0, 1, 0].
When [rbv(x), rbv(y) = 0, 1], it means that x + t < r, and
when [rbv(y), rbv(z) = 1, 0], it means that r < z − t. This
corresponds to the equation:{
x+ t < r
r < z − t (5)
Algorithm 1 Distance consistence algorithm
Require: A distance matrix D
1: initialize a new distance matrix Dˆ, ∀i, j, Dˆi,j =∞
2: r = max{Di,k|∃i, j, k : Di,j +Dj,k = Di,k}
3: ∀Di,j ≤ r: Dˆi,j = Di,j
4: for Dˆi,j ≤ r and Dˆj,k ≤ r and Dˆi,k =∞ do
5: update Dˆi,k = Dˆi,j + Dˆj,k
6: end for
7: ∀Dˆi,j =∞, Dˆi,j = Di,j
8: return the refined distance matrix Dˆ
Which means that (z − t) − (x + t) = (z − x) − 2t > 0.
This conflicts with the assumption that x, y, z are in local view,
which means that z−x ≤ 2t. Analogous to [x, y, z] = [0, 1, 0],
the situation of [1, 0, 1] can also be proved unsatisfied.
Just as the distance consistence in Euclidean space, we can
adjust distance in global view with distances in local view. The
pseudo-code of distance consistence algorithm using global
view is described in Algorithm 1. As parameter t is not revealed
to the aggregator, we should find the range that holds local
view (line 2). We first preserve distance in local view (line
3), then distance in global view are adjusted with the distance
consistence theorem (lines 4-6). At last, the unreached distance
are kept unchanged (line 7). In our implementation, a flag
matrix recording in which iterations Di,j is revised is included,
and the distance can only be updated with modified distance
before current iterations (line 5).
The distance consistence algorithm cannot be used to modify
the unreachable distance. To solve this problem, as for the
custodian, we recommend to add some mediate vales for
embedding. For example, when 2t < 3, the distance of 3.4
and 7.9 are unreachable. The data owner can then generate
a noisy value 5.5. In this way, the Euclidean distance can be
estimated by dˆE(3.4, 5.5) + dˆE(5.5, 7.9). It should be noticed
adding external values increases computing complexity.
B. Differentially Private Bit Vector Encoding
For the the single data encoding, the probability function
of Bit Vector can be written as Pr[y = 1] = 2t/µ. From the
aspect of differential privacy, it provides 0-DP, and no utilities
are guaranteed. To make it feasible, the random variables are
kept unchanged when generated, which means:
Pr[y = 1|ri, t] = Pr[x ∈ [ri − t, ri + t]] (6)
In this way, the distance information is preserved in the
Hamming space, because we have Pr[yai = 1, ybi = 1|ri, t] =
Pr[ri− t ≤ xa ≤ xb ≤ ri+ t]. It implies that dE(xa, xb) ≤ 2t.
In a honest-but-curious setting, only the distance information
is known to the aggregator. However, this mechanism is not
privacy-preserving with a malicious adversary or in the two-
party setting. According to Equation 6, the probability of
Pr[x|ri, t, y] can be learned. More importantly, according to
the distance consistence algorithm, the possible t can be
estimated with the distance matrix. Under such assumptions,
4
the BV mechanism is vulnerable under observation of ri. Like
RAPPOR mechanism, we use a 1Bit-like mechanism in each
set bit. The probability function is:
Pr[y = 1|ri, t] = e

e + 1
· Pr[x ∈ [ri − t, ri + t]]
+
1
e + 1
· Pr[x /∈ [ri − t, ri + t]] (7)
In this paper, this encoding mechanism is called DPBV
(Differentially Private Bit Vector) mechanism. We will further
show that the DPBV mechanism guarantees (, δ)-LDP and is
distance-aware in the anonymized space.
Theorem 2. Encoding mechanism with Equation 7 achieves
-LDP.
Proof. In this mechanism, both ri and t are kept unchanged
when generated. The DPBV for single bit outputs y = 0 or
y = 1 with probability of 1e+1 or
e
e+1 (Equation 7). Thus,
for different numerical value xa, xb ∈ [L,U ] and any output
y, we have:
Pr[y|xa, ri, t] ≤ e · Pr[y|xb, ri, t] (8)
Thus DPBV mechanism for one bit preserves -LDP.
Theorem 3 (Expected number of set components). In the
DPBV setting, the expected number w of components which
are set in each bit vector is:
E[w] = s · (2t
µ
· e
 − 1
e + 1
+
1
e + 1
) (9)
Theorem 3 indicates that the expected common number
of components of different source values is the same. For
the aggregator who receives the encoded data, data in source
databases are indistinguishable.
Theorem 4 (DPBV-Composition). Given random variables
r = {r1, r2, ..., rs}, the randomized response with bit vector
satisfies (, δ)-local differential privacy, where:
δ = (
e
e + 1
)s − e · ( 1
e + 1
)s (10)
Theorem 4 gives the lower bound of the privacy-preserving
level.For the space reasons, the proof is given in the appendix.
In the following experimental setting, s is usually very large.
For example, the DPBV mechanism is (2, 7.5× 10−56)-LDP
when s = 1000.
C. Distance-aware Decoding
With the DPBV encoding mechanism, each original value
is embedded into a vector in Hamming space. In this section,
we focus on computing Euclidean distance information in
Hamming space.
Theorem 5 (Euclidean Distance Estimation). Given Hamming
distance dH between embeded vectorsM(x1) andM(x2), the
Euclidean distance between numerical values x1, x2 ∈ [L,U ]
can be estimated by:
dˆE(x1, x2) =
µ
2s
· (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2 · dH − µe

(e − 1)2 (11)
Proof. As it is stated in the DPBV mechanism, the process
of adding differential privacy to the BV mechanism can be
thought as the randomized response process in the encoding
mechanism: the bits in BV results are kept unchanged with
probability e

e+1 and reversed with probability
1
e+1 .
From the encoding process, the expected hamming distance
can be estimated by:
E[dH ] = 2s · dE
µ
· e
2 + 1
(e + 1)2
+
[
s− 2s · dE
µ
] · 2e
(e + 1)2
(12)
With the correlation between dE and dH , we can then use dH
in the anonymized space to estimate the Euclidean distance. We
can also prove that the error of distance estimation is bounded
(the proof is in the appendix).
Theorem 6. For value x1, x2 with dE = |x1 − x2|, the
aggregator can estimate the distance dˆE with Theorem 5. With
probability at least 1− β, we have:
|dˆE − dE | ≤ µ
2
· (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2
√
ln 2β
2s
(13)
IV. CLUSTERING ON ANONYMOUS DATA
When consolidated by the aggregator, data are in the
anonymous space. Analysis on the integrated anonymous
dataset is limited because we can only estimate distance in the
Hamming space. Motivated by the k-means algorithm, we now
present the kCluster algorithm.
A. KCluster clustering method
The k-means clustering algorithm [26] is one of the most
fundamental clustering methods. It aims at partitioning all the
data points into k clusters by minimizing the within-cluster
sum of squares (denote ui as the mean of points in cluster Ci):
argmin
∑
i∈[k]
∑
p∈Ci
(p− ui)2 (14)
However, the DPBV mechanism is not suitable for k-means
as calculating the mean value is not supported. Instead of
assigning a point to its closest center, we assign a point to its
closest cluster. Given a set of observations {p1, p2, ..., pn}, we
define the average distance between point p and cluster C to
be:
DC(p, Ci) =
∑
p′∈Ci dE(p, p
′
)
|Ci| (15)
With the anonymized data {M(p1),M(p2), ...,M(pn)}, the
distance between an anonymized point and a cluster DC can
be estimated by:
DˆC(M(p), Ci) =
µ ·∑M(p′ )∈Ci [dH(M(p),M(p′)− 2s·e(e+1)2 ]
2s · ( e−1e+1 )2 · |Ci|
(16)
Based on DC , the clustering result is given by finding the
objective C:
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Algorithm 2 DP-kCluster: differentially private clustering
Require: The number of clusters, k; anonymized dataset
D′i∈[n] from n data providers; Decoding parameters, s
and µ; privacy-preserving level ;
1: D′ = D′1 ∪ D
′
2 ∪ ... ∪ D
′
n
2: Randomly choose k records as initial Clusters
C1, C2, ..., Ck.
3: Assign each record into its nearest cluster.
4: l = |D′ |
5: repeat
6: Generate clusters: ∀i ≤ k, C ′i = Ci, Ci = ∅
7: for j = 1, 2, 3, ..., l do
8: index = argmin
t∈{1,2,...,k}
DˆC(M(pj), C ′t)
9: Cindex = Cindex ∪M(pi)
10: end for
11: until ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, Ci = C ′i
12: return Set of clusters C = {C1, C2, ..., Ck}
argmin
C1,C2,...,Ck
∑
i∈[k]
∑
M(p)∈Ci
DC(M(p), Ci) (17)
In the distributed environment, dataset are integrated and
then the DP-kCluster algorithm is run with Algorithm 2. To
produce the final clustering result, kCluster uses iteration to
get a refined result each step. There are two main steps in the
kCluster algorithm.
leftmargin=*
• Step 1: Initializing k clusters. Choose k points as the
initial centroids (line 2-3). Form k clusters by arranging
each point to its nearest centroid.
• Step 2: Iteration. In the j-th iteration, for each point p,
find the closest cluster in (j − 1)-th iteration and reset
p’s label (line 5-11).
We will further show that the DPBV encoding mechanism
can be used for anonymized clustering with current cluster-
ing algorithms. Take DBSCAN as a example. In DBSCAN
clustering algorithm, given distance parameter E, one essential
task is to find out the number of points within distance E.
In Hamming space, the distance threshold is estimated by
Equation 12. Also, the DPBV encoding mechanism can be
used for hierarchical clustering.
B. Decomposition for Vertically Partitioned Data
In this section we focus on calculating distances between
records owned by distributed data custodians. It is different
from the centralized setting that distance should be calculated
on each side of data custodian. For convenience, we assume
that data are held separately by Alice and Bob, and Alice wants
to know the Euclidean distance between record pair (pA, pB).
The target is to compute:
dE(pA, pB)
2 =
d∑
i=1
(pA,i − pB,i)2 (18)
In the horizontally partitioned setting, data held by Alice
and Bob need to be encoded into the Hamming space. The
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Fig. 4. Horizontally partitioned data and vertically partitioned data.
embedded data from Bob are then sent to Alice. From the side
of Alice, the distance can be estimated by:
dˆE(pA, pB) =
1
2s( e
−1
e+1 )
2
√√√√ d∑
i=1
µ2[dH(pA,i, pB,i)− 2s · e

(e + 1)2
]2
(19)
In real life, data in distributed custodians may share com-
mon identifiers and different attributes (vertically partitioned
data). Estimation distance in the vertical setting is different.
We first define L2A,B and R
2
A,B as L
2
A,B =
∑l
i=1(pA,i −
pB,i)
2, R2A,B =
∑d
i=l+1(pA,i − pB,i)2. For Alice, L2A,B can
be calculated preciously without privacy leakage. One common
way to estimated distance of Bob’s part is to encode all of his
data and then estimate the Euclidean distance by:
Rˆ2A,B =
1
4s2( e
−1
e+1 )
4
[ d∑
i=l+1
µ2[dH(pA,i, pB,i)− 2s · e

(e + 1)2
]
]
(20)
Considering that ∀i ∈ [l+1, d], each value of dE(pA,i, pB,i)
can be calculated by Bob, we think the errors of estimating
dE(pA, pB) can be tightened.
R2A,B =
d∑
i=l+1
(pA,i − pB,i)2 (21)
=
d∑
i=l+1
(p2A,i + p
2
B,i)−
d∑
i=l+1
2 · pA,i · pB,i (22)
Let µmax = 2 ×
∑d
i=l+1 µ
2, then R2A,B can be estimated
by:
Rˆ2A,B =
µmax
2s( e
−1
e+1 )
2
[
dH [
d∑
i=l+1
p2A,i + p
2
B,i, (
d∑
i=l+1
2 · pA,i · pB,i)]
− s · 2e

(e + 1)2
]
(23)
Compared with equation 20, equation 23 only needs one-time
encoding for Euclidean distance estimation. In both situation,
the distance between record pair (pA, pB) can be estimated by
dˆE(pA, pB) =
√
L2A,B + Rˆ
2
A,B . In the experimental part, we
will analyze errors of these two distance estimation methods.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first measure the distance consistence in
the anonymized space, then the decomposition for vertically
partitioned data are analyzed. At last, clustering performance
with existing algorithms are presented.
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Datasets. We choose different types of data to evaluate
our clustering algorithms. In the visualization part, we use
three publicly available datasets: blobs based (Aggregation
dataset [27]),circles based (pathbased dataset [28]) and moon-
shape based dataset (“twomoons” [29]). We also use a real life
dataset: the digit dataset [30], composed of 1797 images, each
image is a 8× 8 hand-written digit.
Parameter selection. We embed each numerical value into
Hamming space with s = 1000. For demonstration purpose,
data are regularized to [0, 50] in our experiments. The interval
parameter is set t = 25 in demonstration.
Methodology. We choose kCluster and DBSCAN as basic
clustering algorithms. We first embed source data with BV and
DPBV mechanism, then we retrieve the distance matrix and use
it for clustering. We use the Normalized Mutual Information to
measure the clustering results. For comparison, we also cluster
on the original dataset.
A. Distance estimation utilities
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Fig. 5. Estimation error with s changes.
First, we implement the distance consistence algorithm and
evaluate the average estimation error. A uniformly distributed
dataset within range [0, 25] is generated and encoded with
t = 3. Each time 10, 000 pairs are compared. The average
estimation error is given by:
ERRavg =
1
|Sx||Sy|
∑
x∈Sx,y∈Sy
|dE(x, y)− dˆE(x, y)| (24)
We can see from Figure 5 that with s grows, the average
error given by Equation 24 decreases. With a fixed s, we can
conclude that the distance consistence algorithm can improve
the performance of distance estimation.
B. Partition analysis
In this part, we consider distance estimation over multidi-
mensional data. The error of horizontally partitioned setting are
not covered as because it is the same as the non-decomposition
method in our experiment. For convenience, we set the same
dimension of different data custodians. When encoding with
non-decomposition method, each record is encoded d times
with DPBV mechanism, while it only cost two times for the
Decomposition. As we know, the range of encoded data expands
when decomposition, encoding with s random variables would
bring extra errors, thus the number of random variables we use
in Decomposition is the same as that of non-decomposition.
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Fig. 6. Average distance estimation error for vertically partitioned data.
From Figure 6, it is clear that with the increasing of data
dimensions, the average error becomes larger. The main reason
is that with dimensions increases, the errors accumulate with
the times of encoding. As for Decomposition method, it only
encodes two time whatever dimension is, no encoding error
is contained, thus the error is controlled with explosion of
dimensions.
C. Clustering performances
In this section, we compare proposed algorithms with exist-
ing methods. Firstly, the visualization of mentioned clustering
algorithm is shown in Figure 7. We can see that the clustering
results are not highly affected by anonymization. The results
of privacy-preserving clustering algorithms are not exactly the
same as original ones because distance estimation between two
points is probabilistic.
TABLE III
CLUSTERING RESULTS
clustering methods privacy level NMI
k-means - 74.32%
RSP+k-means 50%
75%
63.65%
67.08%
ADP+k-means σ = 1
σ = 2
73.99%
72.72%
kCluster - 74.65%
LDP+kCluster (1, 8.9× 10
−137)-LDP
(2, 7.5× 10−56)-LDP
70.89%
73.57%
To better comprehend the impact of applying anonymization
in clustering process. We run a series of experiments on the digit
dataset. Each picture is transformed into a vector with length
64. We compare our privacy-preserving clustering algorithm
with the RSP based and ADP based methods. For the ADP
based algorithm, we keep the variance of noise σ = 1 and 2.
For the RSP based method, we project its dimension to 50%
and 75% of the original dimension. Then the transformed data
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Fig. 7. Visualization of different clustering algorithms.
are clustered using typical k-means algorithm. The clustering
results are listed in Table III. The performance of kCluster
is better that that of k-means. Unfortunately, there lacks a
baseline for comparing privacy-preserving level between (, δ)-
LDP, ADP and RSP based clustering algorithms. While it
should mention that our LDP is in the anonymization space,
which can preserve semantic information. For ADP based
mechanism, adding noise with σ ∈ {1, 2} can achieve high
utilities, However, the range of data can be quite determinated
after ADP when σ is at a low level. For example, encoding
value x = 1 with σ = 2, we get 3. From the perturbated value
we can still be sure with high confidence that the original data
is not big. From this perspective, using LDP in the anonymized
space preserves higher privacy-preserving level.
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Fig. 8. Performance of DP-kCluster with epsilon.
Shown in Figure 8, we also test the influence of  to the
clustering results (with δ = ( e

e+1 )
s − e · ( 1e+1 )s). As the
encoding process is randomized, the clustering performance
fluctuates within a small range. According our experiments, we
can achieve high utility with  ≥ 1. Under such configuration,
high privacy-preserving level is guaranteed.
VI. PRIVACY ANALYSIS AND LIMITATIONS
Fig. 9. the length of s under (, δ)-LDP.
As detailed in Section III, with an anonymization mechanism
(BV), each scalar value is turned into a bit vector. Then with
the guarantee of LDP, each vector in {0, 1}s is noised after
perturbation. In this way, the privacy is guaranteed by the
anonymization process and the perturbation process. To achieve
(, δ)-LDP, we can set s with s = d ln δ−ln(e+1)e. Show in
Figure 9, with the increase of , the length of anonymized
bit vector increases. Also, we notice that s also increases
when δ decreases. Technologically, this is because we expand
the anonymized space to achieve lower δ, which means that
Pr[M(x)] descends.
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Fig. 10. HBC aggregator.
Fig. 11. malicious adversary
We also consider two types of attackers, the Honest But
Curious (HBC) aggregator and a malicious attacker with access
to all of the configuration parameters, including the data of
range, random variables and . For an HBC aggregator. We can
plot the probability of all possible output o with input x = 24.3
and x = 26.2 in the anonymized (Figure 10) under  = 1. The
probability space of value 24.3 is likely to that of 26.2. For
demonstration, we only set s = 10, as the anonymized space
would be too large to be shown when s becomes large. In
this example, the privacy-preserving level is guaranteed by
anonymized mechanism and LDP. For output o ∈ {0, 1}s,
Pr[M(x) = o] is very small.
For the malicious attacker, we wonder if he can retrieve
the original data. In this experiment, we set s = 1000 and
 = 1. We can see in Figure 11 that for each data x ∈ X ,
we have Pr[M(x) = o] → 0, which leads to indistinguisha-
bilities. In this example, with received vector, the adversary
might guess the source value to be in [26, 30]. However, the
DPBV mechanism cannot prevent collusion attacks. For the
adversaries knowing original data and its corresponding bit
vectors, representing know XA and {DPBV (x)|∀x ∈ XA}.
To a certain extent, the value of y can be retrieved when
s is large. The malicious adversary can retrieve yˆ by y ∈
{xa + dE(xa, y), xa + dE(xa, y)} as the distance information
contains original data and we designed DPBV mechanism to
be distance-aware.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This work investigates encoding mechanism with LDP
guarantees and its application in distributed clustering. Our
results show validate that we can achieve (, δ)-local differential
privacy guarantees in the anonymized space as well as high
distance estimation and clustering utilities. Our proposed
solution can be used in privacy-preserving data sharing and
multi-party clustering in the distributed environment.
As an application case, we designed a clustering algorithm
for distributed clustering with only distance information in the
anonymized space. A natural problem is that can this encoding
mechanism be used in other analyzing tasks. As for future work,
we plan to use DPBV mechanism for more aggregate statistics,
such as mean estimation. We also wants this mechanism to be
used in privacy-preserving classification.
As far as we know, current methods with -DP guarantees
can only work in interactive clustering or clustering with a
trusted aggregator. In this paper, we only use (, δ)-locally
differentially private anonymization for data collection and
analyzing. It stays an open question that can -LDP be achieved
in a anonymization mechanism that is still distance-aware? Up
to now, we think it remains a challenge.
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APPENDIX
Given random variables r = {r1, r2, ..., rs}, the randomized
response with bit vector satisfies (, δ)-local differential privacy,
where δ = ( e

e+1 )
s − e · ( 1e+1 )s.
Proof. As random variables are given, ∀ri ∈ r, we have:
Pr[B
′
= b
′ |X = x] = Pr[B′ = b′ |B = b,X = x] · Pr[B = b|X = x]
= Pr[B
′
= b
′ |B = b] (25)
First, we consider the situation on encoding with one bit
(s = 1). Without loss of generality, for bi ∈ {0, 1} in the bit
vector encoding process, it holds that:
Pr[B
′
i = b
′
i|Bi = bi] = (
e
e + 1
)b
′
ibi ·( 1
e + 1
)1−b
′
ibi (26)
The b
′
i  bi operation returns 1 if b
′
i = bi and 0 otherwise.
Taking all random variables {r1, r2, ..., rs} into consideration,
we have:
Pr[B
′
= b
′ |B = b] = ( e

e + 1
)b
′
1b1 · ( 1
e + 1
)1−b
′
1b1 × ...
× ( e

e + 1
)b
′
sbs · ( 1
e + 1
)1−b
′
sbs
= (
e
e + 1
)
∑s
i=1(b
′
ibi) · ( 1
e + 1
)s−
∑s
i=1(b
′
ibi) (27)
In this way, it is clear that Pr[B
′ |B] ≤ ( ee+1 )s = Pr[B
′
=
B]. And then it holds that, given ∀BA, BB ∈ {0, 1}s, BA 6=
BB :
Pr[B
′ |BA] ≤ e Pr[B′ |BB ] + ( e

e + 1
)s − e · ( 1
e + 1
)s
Thus, the DPBV achieves (, δ)-LDP, where δ = ( e

e+1 )
s −
e · ( 1e+1 )s.
For value x1, x2 with dE = |x1 − x2|, the aggregator can
estimate the distance dˆE with Lemma 5. With probability at
least 1− β, we have:
|dˆE − dE | ≤ µ
2
· (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2
√
ln 2β
2s
(28)
Proof. According to the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [21], we
have:
Pr
[|dH − E[dH ]| ≥ t] ≤ 2 · e− 2t2s (29)
Then we get:
Pr
[|f2 ·2s · dˆE
µ
− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2 ·2s · dE
µ
| ≥ t] ≤ 2 · e− 2t2s (30)
Which means:
Pr
[|dˆE − dE | ≥ µt
2s · ( e−1e+1 )2
] ≤ 2 · e− 2t2s (31)
Thus by setting t = θ · 2s · ( e−1e+1 )2, we obtain:
Pr[|dˆE − dE | ≥ θµ] ≤ 2 · e−8(
e−1
e+1 )
4sθ2 (32)
Set β = 2 · e−8( e
−1
e+1 )
4sθ2 , then the error is:
θµ ≤ µ
2
· (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2
√
ln 2β
2s
(33)
Thus, the proof is concluded
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